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In the last weeks, members of the European Parliament and observers in the legal
and academic community have, explicitly or implicitly, criticised the European
Commission and the Court of Justice for their handling of ongoing infringement
procedures. Put simply, the two institutions have been criticised for moving the
existing cases forward, despite the fact that certain countries (first Italy, then
followed by almost all other Member States) are in lockdown and, consequently, their
administrations are unable to effectively respond.
There is no doubt that national administrations are currently facing extraordinary
and unpredictable challenges, while operating at limited capacity. Therefore, calls
for some extra flexibility, if not leniency, with regard to infringement proceedings
are probably understandable. That notwithstanding, certain criticism levelled
against the Commission and the Court appears not to have taken fully into account
certain features of infringement procedures. It may therefore be useful, for a proper
understanding of the status of play, to call to mind certain key principles in this field. 
First, it is true that the Commission enjoys very broad discretion as to when and how
it investigates suspected infringements of EU law on the part of national authorities.
However, that discretion is not unfettered, for the Member States can argue that
the Commission’s conduct, because of its timing, has unduly affected their right
of defence. During the administrative stage of the procedure, the Commission
is to give defendant Member States a reasonable period to reply to the letter of
formal notice and the reasoned opinion and, where appropriate, remedy the alleged
breaches of EU law. A time-limit granted to the Member States can be suspended
or prolonged by the Commission. Conversely, the Court does not have the power
to alter it. Yet, the legality of that period is subject to judicial review. Where the
Court finds that, having taken into account all the circumstances of the case, a
time-limit was unreasonably short, the action is dismissed as inadmissible (see
e.g. C-293/85, Commission v Belgium). In the present circumstances, asked by the
Member States on 19 March 2020, the Commission has agreed, in the light of the
COVID-19 pandemic, to extend all formal deadlines in ongoing procedures until 15
June 2020. In addition, although it is for the Commission to choose when it brings
an action and considerations relating to the timing cannot, in principle, affect the
admissibility of that action, the defendant Member Stats may provide evidence that
the Commission’s choice of time has made it more difficult for its authorities to refute
the Commission’s arguments, thereby breaching its rights of the defence (see e.g.
C-333/99, Commission v France, para. 25). 
Second, as far as proceedings before the Court are concerned, with messages of
19 March 2020 and 3 April 2020, the Court has announced that, save for specific
exceptions, the time-limits prescribed in pending proceedings (including those
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under Article 258 to 260 TFEU) are extended by one month. In addition, and until
further notice, the time-limits that will be fixed by the registry in the future will also
be increased by one month. All hearings scheduled until 30 April 2020 have also
been adjourned until a later date. Therefore, pending proceedings have been, for
the parties, either ‘frozen’ or at least delayed. Nevertheless, judicial activities are not
suspended altogether, as Court has enabled its staff to work remotely. The Court
has also adopted various measures, in line with the applicable rules of procedure, so
that the processing of cases is not interrupted: e.g. decisions taken using a written
procedure, questions addressed to the parties in writing, and simplified conditions
for opening an e-Curia account to lodge and receive procedural documents in an
electronic form. Moreover, the delivery of judgments and Opinions has not been
suspended, but it is done ‘in bundles’ in dedicated hearings.
Decisions taken in the context of infringement proceedings are no exception. For
example, on 2 April, the Court has delivered an important judgment under Article 258
TFEU in which it found that, by refusing to comply with the temporary mechanism
for the relocation of applicants for international protection, Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic have failed to fulfil their obligations under EU law (Joined
Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17). On 8 April, the Court has, in accordance
with Article 279 TFEU, imposed certain interim measures in the context of the
pending (C-791/19) action brought by the Commission against Poland regarding
the new disciplinary regime for judges. The Court ordered Poland to (i) suspend
the application of the relevant provisions of national law, constituting the basis for
the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court to adjudicate,
both at first instance and on appeal, in disciplinary cases relating to judges, and
(ii) refrain from transferring cases pending before the Disciplinary Chamber to a
formation of the court that does not meet the requirements of independence, and (iii)
communicate to the Commission, within one month, all the measures it has adopted
in order to comply fully with that order (C-791/19 R). As far as Article 260(2) TFEU
is concerned, on 12 March, the Court ruled against Italy for its failure to recover
incompatible State aid granted to the hotel sector in Sardinia, imposing on that
Member State a lump sum and penalty payments (C-576/18). 
With regard to the last type of judgments, the issue arose as to whether a Member
State in lockdown is to bear the financial penalties – in the form of periodic penalty
payments per day – from the date of delivery of the until the end of the lockdown.
That is, at least in a first stage, not for the Court to decide. It is for the Commission to
verify how long a failure established in a judgment persists and, as a consequence,
calculate the payments due by a defaulting Member State (see e.g. T-139/06,
France v Commission). However, Member States are entitled to challenge the
Commission’s determinations (see e.g. C-292/11 P, Commission v Portugal), and
do so directly before the Court (see Article 51 of the Statue of the Court). Should
a Member State consider that, because of some extraordinary circumstances, it
was impossible or excessively difficult for its administration to remedy the breach
during a specific period, it could invoke a case of force majeure (or absolute
impossibility). The Court has consistently recognised, also in this context, the validity
of the principle ad impossibilia nemo tenetur (see e.g. C-101/84, Commission v
Italy). As AG Wahl pointed out, the impossibility to comply may only be temporary,
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which means that it can be overcome after a certain period of time, or it can be
lasting, which means that it will permanently prevent compliance (see Opinion in
C-527/12, Commission v Germany, points 50-53). It could be argued that a sudden
and unforeseeable lockdown could amount to a case supervening temporary
impossibility. Thus, if a Member State is able to adduce evidence showing that, in
a given period, it was objectively impossible to remedy the original breach of EU
law (that declared in the judgment given under Article 258 TFEU), that fact could
perhaps have repercussions on its obligation to pay periodic penalty payments
imposed under Article 260(2) TFEU. Indeed, the failure declared in the latter
judgment is but a ‘compound failure’: original failure plus failure to comply with
the Article 258 TFEU judgment (see e.g. Opinion of AG Fennelly in C-197/98,
Commission v Greece, point 19). The two failures are inextricably intertwined. So,
a refusal of the Commission to ‘neutralise’ the amounts of penalty payments due
for that period could, where appropriate, be challenged before the Court. If that
happens, it will finally be for the Court to verify, in the light of the evidence produced,
whether the Member State’s arguments on this point are convincing. 
According to a well-known Latin adage, extremis malis extrema remedia (desperate
times call for desperate measures). Unquestionably, the EU Member States are
currently in a desperate time, fighting an ‘extreme evil’. However, it is not evident
that, in the field of infringement proceedings, there is the need for desperate or
extreme measures. The rules and principles governing that procedure seem to
offer Member States a rich toolkit that should enable them to assert the (admittedly,
significant) problems and difficulties that their administration may encounter in
following-up the infringement cases currently open before the Commission and
pending before Court.
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